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PRIVACY TORT LAW IN NEW YORK: SOME EXISTING
ROUTES TO RECOVERY
INTRODUCTION
"[T]he so-called 'right of privacy' has not as yet found an
abiding place in our jurisprudence, and, as we view it, the doctrine
cannot now be incorporated without doing violence to settled prin-
ciples of law. . .. "I
So concluded the New York Court of Appeals in Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co., 2 a 1902 decision dismissing a complaint
alleging invasion of privacy for failure to state a cause of action.
The plaintiff in Roberson brought suit for damages incurred when
defendants used plaintiff's portrait, without her knowledge or con-
sent, for commercial advertising purposes. In dismissing, the court
commented that while the legislature could easily forbid such ad-
vertising if it chose to, courts, being "without authority to legis-
late,"3 could not exceed the bounds of precedent.4 The New York
State Legislature responded to widespread disapproval of Rober-
son by enacting sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law.5 Sec-
tion 50 makes a misdemeanor any advertising or trade use of the
name or picture of a living person, withoit that person's consent.
Section 51, more central to this discussion, provides such person
the right to maintain a private action for damages and injunctive
relief.6
1. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 556, 64 N.E. 442, 447 (1902).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 545, 64 N.E. at 443.
4. Prior New York cases were cited holding that unauthorized publication of one's pic-
ture was not actionable since "the law takes no cognizance of a sentimental injury, indepen-
dent of a wrong to person or property." Id. at 552, 64 N.E. at 446.
5. 1903 N.Y. LAws Act of April 6, 1903, ch. 132.
6. Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for adver-
tising purposes or trade without the written consent first obtained as above pro-
vided may maintain an equitable action in the supreme court of this state
against the person, firm or corporation so using his name, portrait or picture, to
prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for
any injuries sustained by reason of such use and if the defendant shall have
knowingly used such person's name, portrait or picture in such manner as is
forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act, the jury, in its discretion, may
award exemplary damages.
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These statutes do not appear to affect a right to privacy other
than that violated by the commercial appropriation of an individ-
ual's name or likeness, notwithstanding the identification by Pros-
ser and the Restatement (Second) of TortsO of four distinct torts
of invasion of privacy. These four are:
1. Unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another;
2. Appropriation of the other's name or likeness;
3. Unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life; and
4. Publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light
before the public."
These are distinct torts, involving four different types of objection-
able conduct, yet because they are all termed invasions of privacy,
considerable confusion has arisen in New York concerning which,
if any, are actionable under current state tort doctrines. The ques-
tion is further complicated by the seeming inconsistency between
state and federal courts in determining and applying New York
common law. The first two sections of this Comment will focus on
the language of state and federal courts in some recent decisions
concerning "unreasonable intrusion," and demonstrate that New
York's version of the law of privacy is neither as outdated nor as
schizophrenic as some of its critics have indicated. The last section
will consider the protection from intrusive invasion which may be
afforded under New York's existing tort doctrines.10
I. PRIVACY TORT LAW IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS
Numerous articles have been written recently bemoaning the
failure of New York's state courts to recognize a cause of action for
intrusive invasion of privacy.1 The root of this concern is the pro-
fusion of state court decisions since Roberson holding that no gen-
1903 N.Y. LAWS Act of April 6, 1903, ch. 132.
7. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1981) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
9. Id.
10. Constitutional questions will not be discussed herein; the disputes at issue here in-
volve actions between individuals or private entities only.
11. See, e.g., Brooks & Rolfe, Interference With Privacy-In What Forms Might it be
Actionable in Virginia, 13 U. RICH. L. REV. 159 (1979); Greenawalt, New York's Right of
Privacy-The Need for a Change, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 159 (1975); Leitner, Torts, 1979
Survey of New York Law, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 433, 455 (1980); Note, Unnecessary Analysis
of Elements of Right of Privacy by Court of Appeals: A Possible Basis for Extension of the
Tort in New York?, 36 BROOKLYN L. REV. 507 (1970).
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eral right to sue for invasion of privacy exists in New York except
as conferred by statute, that is, Civil Rights Law section 51, re-
garding commercial appropriation of another's name or likeness.12
In case after case, with little or no discussion, the courts declare
flatly that under Roberson there is no common law right to privacy
in New York. This apparent broadening of the Roberson holding
has been interpreted, as will be discussed, as covering all forms of
invasion of privacy, and seems unjustifiable in light of an increas-
ing national awareness of the individual's "right to be let alone." 3
In fact, however, these cases all concerned some variation on the
publication or commercial appropriation forms of the tort, rather
than intrusion.
14
For example, in Woftowicz v. Delacorte Press, 5 the court of
appeals recently considered whether the commercial publication of
two books and a movie in which plaintiffs were portrayed in suffi-
cient detail to allow their identification constituted an actionable
invasion of their privacy. In a memorandum opinion, the court de-
termined that no recovery was allowable under section 51 since
neither plaintiffs' names nor pictures were used. The court further
noted that, "whatever may be the law in other jurisdictions with
respect to the right to judicial relief for invasion of privacy in con-
sequence of unreasonable publicity, in our State thus far there has
been no recognition of such right other than under sections 50 and
51 of the Civil Rights Law."' 6
12. The cases most frequently cited are Flores v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 N.Y.2d 276, 164
N.E.2d 853, 196 N.Y.S.2d 975 (1959) (commercial appropriation); Gautier v. Pro-Football,
Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952) (unauthorized televising); Koussevitsky v. Allen,
Towne & Heath, 188 Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct., New York County 1947) (unau-
thorized biography); Rosenberg v. Lee's Carpet & Furniture Warehouse Outlet, Inc., 80
Misc. 2d 479, 363 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup. Ct., New York County 1974) (commercial
appropriation).
13. RESTATEMENT § 652A comment. See Beaney, The Griswold Case and the Ex-
panding Right to Privacy, 1966 Wisc. L. REv. 979; Ezer, Intrusion on Solitude: Herein of
Civil Rights and Civil Wrongs, 21 LAW IN TRANSITION 63 (1961).
14. The tort of unreasonable intrusion does not involve publication or publicity; the
tort is complete with the act of intrusion. RESTATEMENT § 652A comment.
15. 43 N.Y.2d 858, 374 N.E.2d 129, 403 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1978).
16. Id. at 860, 374 N.E.2d at 130, 403 N.Y.S. at 219 (emphasis added). See also Cohen
v. Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d 493, 497 n.2, 382 N.E.2d 1145, 1147, 410 N.Y.S.2d 282, 284
(1978) (citing Wojtowicz as standing for the statement that "[iln New York, there exists no
so-called common law right to privacy"); Flores v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 N.Y.2d at 280, 164




Thus notwithstanding the seemingly all-encompassing lan-
guage of these decisions, they may properly be viewed as direct
descendants of Roberson, and of precedential value only where the
alleged invasion of privacy is an act of publication or commercial
appropriation, rather than intrusion. They are also reasonable
given the narrow coverage of the statute under which they were
brought.1" One writer suggests that a possible reason for limiting
recovery to the Roberson situation of commercial appropriation of
a name or likeness may have been the legislators' belief that in a
different, more serious situation, the courts would recognize a com-
mon law right of privacy, without the necessity of a legislative en-
actment."' In any event, some perception of legislative preemption
appears to underlie the courts' reluctance to go beyond the statute,
beginning perhaps with Roberson's dictum that courts are "with-
out authority to legislate.""
One interesting judicial divergence from the normally strict
construction of section 51 exists in the 1964 case of Spahn v. Ju-
lian Messner, Inc.2 0 Renowned baseball pitcher Warren Spahn
sued the publisher and author of The Warren Spahn Story, a
highly fictionalized, unauthorized account of Spahn's life, including
fabricated personal introspection and dialogue, and erroneous rep-
resentations of his private relationships. In a lengthy opinion, the
Supreme Court of New York County cited section 51 (under which
Spahn had requested damages and injunctive relief) as recognized
by New York law to be the "fountainhead of the right to legal re-
dress for the invasion, appropriation and commercial exploitation
17. See supra note 6.
18. Brooks & Rolfe, supra note 11 at 492. The authors comment further, however, that
since the statute has not been significantly amended, and in view of the holdings discussed
above, "it can no longer be argued creditably [sic] that the legislature favors a right of
privacy broader than that statutorily enacted." Id. at 492 n.21.
19. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. at 556, 64 N.E. at 447. The inter-
action of legislature and court in forming tort law is beyond the scope of this discussion, but
see Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L.
REv. 265 (1963) and Bischoff, The Dynamics of Tort Law: Court or Legislature, 4 VERMONT
L. REV. 35 (1979). Peck notes, quoting Professor Hart, that "[Tihe state constitutions pre-
scribe the ways in which bills shall become law, and failing to enact a bill is not one of
them." Peck, supra at 291.
20. 43 Misc. 2d 219, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1964), affd, 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274
N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966), vacated and remanded on constitutional grounds, 387 U.S. 329, afl'd
21 N.Y.2d 126, 233 N.E.2d 840, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967).
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of the individual's personality."21 After stressing the expanding ju-
dicial cognizance of a fundamental right to privacy and the impor-
tance of preserving the individual's "inviolate personality," the
opinion quoted "the guiding principle that '[a] statute of this kind
is not "to be obeyed grudgingly, by construing it narrowly and
treating it as though it did not exist for any purpose other than
that embraced within the strict construction of its words." -22 The
court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to recovery under
section 51, and the opinion closed with this surprising paragraph:
To return to the four category definition of "Privacy" by Dean Prosser,
defendants have (1) intruded upon the plaintiff's solitude and into his pri-
vate affairs, (2) disclosed embarrassing "facts" about the plaintiff, (3) placed
the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye, and (4) appropriated, for defen-
dants' advantage, the plaintiffs name and likeness. Such intrusion, disclo-
sure and appropriation for commercial exploitation are proscribed by sec-
tion 51 of the Civil Rights Law.2
3
Section 51 contains no reference to Prosser's categories, nor to in-
trusions of any sort other than the commercial use of name or like-
ness. The incorporation of all four forms of tortious invasion of
privacy within the scope of the statute was a significant broadening
of prior interpretations, and was not disavowed by the court of ap-
peals in affirming.24 Indeed, that court echoed the supreme court's
broad construction of section 51: "Over the years since the stat-
ute's enactment in 1903, its social desirability and remedial nature
have led to its being given a liberal construction consonant with its
over-all purpose. '2 5 Here, then, is dictum, if not binding precedent,
evidencing the possibility that New York acknowledges a more
general right to privacy than section 51 standing alone would
imply.
The court of appeals went yet further, however, in Nader v.
General Motors Corporation,2 6 an intrusion case determined under
District of Columbia law. Ralph Nader, an outspoken critic of the
safety and design of General Motors products, alleged that General
Motors had learned of the impending publication of his book Un-
21. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d at 221, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 532.
22. Id. at 222, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
23. Id. at 233, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 543 (emphasis added).
24. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877
(1966), vacated, 387 U.S. 239 (1967).
25. Id. at 327, 221 N.E.2d at 547, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
26. 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970).
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safe at Any Speed, and in its efforts to suppress the criticism and
disclosures therein, violated his right to privacy. The complaint
specifically claimed that General Motors hired others to conduct a
campaign of harassment and intimidation against Nader, which in-
cluded public surveillance for unreasonably extended periods, tap-
ping his telephone, and eavesdropping on his private conversa-
tions.27 The court, citing a prior District of Columbia case,28 found
that the law of that jurisdiction did recognize unreasonable intru-
sion as an invasion of privacy,29 and then set about to predict
whether Nader's claims were actionable under District of Columbia
law. However, Judge Fuld, even though recognizing that the only
issue on appeal was the legal sufficiency of the complaint,80
launched a detailed examination of the extent to which each al-
leged act constituted such an invasion, purportedly for the gui-
dance of the trial court. 1 In concluding that overzealous surveil-
lance, wiretapping, and eavesdropping were actionable, the opinion
cited numerous cases in other jurisdictions which recognized those
acts as tortious intrusions.2
Judge Breitel concurred in the result only, protesting the ma-
jority's premature "excursion" into issues of relevancy and alloca-
tion of evidence before trial.3 3 He found the court's extended anal-
ysis of the pleadings not only unnecessary but an improper
exercise of judicial review, given the uncertainty of the developing
law of privacy and the narrowness of the question certified on ap-
peal, i.e., the legal sufficiency of the complaint.
27. The complaint also alleged that General Motors' agents interviewed Nader's ac-
quaintances about his personal opinions and habits, caused him to be accosted by women
for illicit purposes, and made threatening, harassing, and obnoxious phone calls to him.
28. Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
29. "We approve the extension of the tort of invasion of privacy to instances of intru-
sion, whether by physical trespass or not, into spheres from which an ordinary man in a
plaintiff's position could reasonably expect that the particular defendant should be ex-
cluded." Id. at 704.
30. Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d at 564, 255 N.E.2d at 770, 307 N.Y.S.2d
at 651.
31. However, as pointed out in a contemporary discussion of the case, the lower courts
were already apparently familiar with the status of the law, as indicated by their opinions in
this case. Note, supra note 11, at 508.
32. E.g., Fowler v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 343 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1965);
Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964); Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va.
869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958).




Judge Breitel's concerns have been echoed by courts and com-
mentators, some of whom have suggested that the primary purpose
underlying Judge Fuld's digression beyond traditional judicial re-
view was perhaps to "provide a foundation for the acceptance of
invasion of privacy by intrusion in New York. ' 34 That hypothesis,
although plausible, will not be tested until an intrusion dispute de-
terminable under the laws of New York comes before the New
York courts. Whether or not correct, however, it is further evi-
dence that New York may be inclined to follow the lead of other
jurisdictions in recognizing such a tort.
II. THE EXPANSION OF PRIVACY TORT DOCTRINES BY NEW YORK
FEDERAL COURTS
Close on the heels of, and depending heavily upon Nader, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York in 1971 declared:
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Roberson dictum about "right of privacy"
were taken to include intrusions, it appears to us the New York Court of
Appeals would not follow it today. Since this Court is bound to apply the law
as it believes the New York Court of Appeals would today apply it, it is not
bound by Roberson and should recognize a cause of action for intrusion
here.
35
The occasion was Galella v. Onassis,6 the highly publicized litiga-
tion between photographer Ron Galella and President Kennedy's
widow Jacqueline Onassis. Galella was shown to have closely and
continuously trailed Onassis and her children and to have fright-
ened and annoyed them repeatedly in public. In its determination
that Roberson would not survive a direct challenge in the court of
appeals, the district court cited Fuld's opinion in Nader as an ef-
fort to introduce intrusive invasion of privacy as an actionable tort
in New York. 7 Similarly, Judge Breitel's statement in that case to
the effect that "thus far" the court of appeals had not recognized a
common law right to privacy was termed a broad hint that the
34. Note, supra note 11, at 508. See also Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 229
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1975); Brooks & Rolfe, supra note 11, at
494; O'Hara & Wolff, Torts, 1970 Survey of New York Law, 22 SYRAcusE L. R-v. 423, 438
(1971).
35. GalelIa v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
36. 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
37. Id. at 229.
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court was prepared for a change."8 The Galella opinion pointed
also to portions of the New York Penal Law dealing with harass-
ment, 9 and to the provisions in other jurisdictions for protection
from extensive shadowing and observation 0 to support its conclu-
sion that "Nader foreshadows the course which the [N.Y.] Court of
Appeals... would follow today in dealing with intrusions upon the
right of privacy.
''41
This decision has been criticized as an example of excessive
"pioneering" by the federal courts, which are portrayed as deliber-
ately ignoring the clear mandate of the state's highest court to the
contrary.42 Despite such criticism, Galella was looked to in 1977 by
another New York federal court in Birnbaum v. United States,
3
where plaintiffs sued the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act for invasion of privacy resulting from the covert open-
ing of their personal sealed mail by the Central Intelligence
Agency. Under the Act, the law of the state in which the alleged
wrongful act occurred is controlling,44 and in discussion of the sta-
tus of New York's law regarding privacy the court commented,
"[L]ower courts in the state have generally continued to acknowl-
edge Roberson while finding ways to avoid it and grant recovery.
'45
On the basis of that history, and the court's sense that provisions
of the New York Penal Law prohibiting interference with private
communications 4 manifested a strong state policy against such in-
terference generally, the court concluded, "[tihe evidence is over-
38. Id.
39. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.25 (McKinney 1980) provides that:
[A] person is guilty of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm
another person: ... (3) He follows a person in or about a public place or places;
or ... (5) He engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which
alarm or seriously annoy such other person and which serve no legitimate
purpose.
These provisions were viewed in Galella as evidence that New York recognized "the impor-
tance of protecting the 'right to be left [sic] alone.'" Id.
40. Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. at 229.
41. Id. at 230.
42. Brooks & Rolfe, supra note 11, at 495; O'Hara & Wolff, supra note 34, at 459.
43. 436 F. Supp. 967 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), modified, 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978).
44. Id. at 976.
45. Id. at 977-78. Galella is cited as .ne of many authorities supporting the court's
statement quoted. Other cases portrayed as "avoiding" Roberson did so by "applying law of
privacy of sister states where some events occurred," and "finding 'outrageous' breach of
confidence." Id. at 978.
46. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.25 (McKinney 1980).
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whelming" that New York would allow a right of recovery for in-
trusion into private mails.47 As the court of appeals noted in
affirming:
Whatever the sweep of some of the language in the case, Roberson does not
bar a cause of action for intrusion. As indicated, the "right to privacy" in-
cludes several discrete torts within its ambit, of which appropriation is only
one .... That the Roberson court rejected a privacy right in the context of an
appropriation does not imply a rejection of a remedy for intrusion48
Finally, two other recent federal court cases relied heavily on
Galella and Birnbaum in predicting that New York would recog-
nize a right to privacy beyond Roberson. In both Spock v. United
States49 and Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General," the
District Court for the Southern District of New York held that
New York courts would recognize a cause of action for violation of
the right to be free from unreasonable intrusion. A question these
four federal cases pose is, to what extent may their pronounce-
ments be considered "New York law?" Since the issue of tort re-
covery for invasion of privacy is traditionally one of state law, fed-
eral court decisions on that issue are not binding on state courts. 51
However, such decisions may be persuasive authority, 2 and in
New York have been deemed "entitled to great weight. . . in con-
sidering a similar situation."53 Thus, since no state court decision
on the question of intrusive invasion of privacy exists, Galella,
Birnbaum, Spock, and Socialist Workers could reasonably be con-
sidered substantial, if not binding, precedent when such a case
does arise in New York.
III. PROTECTION FROM INTRUSIVE INVASION OF PRIVACY UNDER
47. Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. at 978. The use of a criminal statute to
imply a private cause of action will be discussed further infra.
48. Id., 588 F.2d at 323.
49. 464 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
50. 463 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
51. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 205 (1940). For New York authority on this point, see 1
CARMODY-WAIT 2d Federal Question § 2.71 (1965); Orange and Rockland Util., Inc. v. New
England Petroleum Corp., 60 A.D.2d 233, 400 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1st Dep't 1977); Marsich v. East-
man Kodak Co., 244 A.D. 295, 279 N.Y.S. 140 (2d Dep't 1935).
52. 1 CARMODY-W~rr 2d Federal Question, supra note 51.




EXISTING NEW YORK TORT DOCTRINES
The remainder of this discussion will center on certain key de-
cisions in other jurisdictions which have explicitly recognized a
right to recovery for intrusive invasion of privacy, and compare the
scope of such right elsewhere with that under accepted New York
doctrines. In so doing, it must be noted that there are numerous
forms of intrusion upon privacy which are and have been the sub-
ject of tort litigation.5 The focus here will be upon those which
seem to occur in case law with the most frequency: visual surveil-
lance and eavesdropping. Obviously not all jurisdictions which
have considered these forms of intrusion actionable torts can be
covered here; one jurisdiction which has recognized a relatively lib-
eral right to recover for such torts will be emphasized.55 Assuming,
for the sake of discussion, that the New York Court of Appeals at
some point explicitly refused to recognize as an independent tort
the sort of intrusions discussed above, it would be useful to inquire
by what other routes a plaintiff in New York might recover.
One case which appears to be cited with great regularity in
discussions of eavesdropping"e as an actionable tort, McDaniel v.
Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 57 concerned the secret installation
by defendant of a mechanical listening device in plaintiff's hospital
room. The complaint alleged that as a result of defendant's over-
hearing of all of plaintiff's private conversations with her husband,
doctor, nurses, and friends, she "suffered great mental pain and
distress, her feelings were wounded, she was greatly embarrassed,
shocked and humiliated,"58 although unaware of the bugging until
some four months after her release from the hospital. Georgia's pe-
nal code prohibited eavesdropping as a misdemeanor, and another
54. As illustrated in the cases above, these forms include various methods of surveil-
lance, including shadowing and filming, opening of mail, and various methods of eavesdrop-
ping, including wiretapping and electronic bugging. Not discussed but also extensively liti-
gated are unconsented-to entry into and/or photographing of homes, repeated harassing
telephone calls, examination of private records or papers, and use of binoculars, among
countless others.
55. For a summary of treatment in other jurisdictions, see 62 AM. Jur. 2d Privacy §§
41, 42 (1972) and sources cited therein.
56. The term "eavesdropping" is used here to include surreptitious overhearing, either
directly by ear or by means of some mechanical device such as a wiretap, microphone, am-
plifier, or telephone extension, of the words of another spoken on a private occasion.
57. 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939).
58. Id. at -, 2 S.E.2d at 812.
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statute provided that "where the law requires one to forbear the
doing of that which may injure another, although no action be
given in express terms, upon the accrual of damages the injured
party may recover."' 9 In upholding the cause of action, the court
stated: "The acts of the defendant were admittedly wilful and in-
tentional, and in such circumstances it is not necessary to recovery
that physical injury shall have been sustained, where there is
mental pain and suffering." 60
A. Civil Actions Derived From Penal Statutes
Similar actions, if brought in New York State, might be based
on Penal Law § 250.05, which defines eavesdropping as unlawful
wiretapping or other mechanical overhearing of a conversation, and
punishes both as felonies. 1 Although this statute provides only for
criminal penalties, there is authority, both generally and in New
York, for inferring a private cause of action from such a statute:
6 2
It is established in New York that violation of a prohibitory statute gives rise
to tort liability .... The only limitations on the doctrine are the familiar
principles that the harm brought about by the violation must be the kind of
harm which the statute sought to prevent and the plaintiff must be among
the class of persons whom the statute was designed to protect.6 3
In cases of unconsented-to bugging, outside telephone extensions
or wiretapping, the argument that such harm is exactly that
against which the statute is directed, and a victim of such an intru-
sion is exactly the person whom the statute was designed to pro-
59. Id. at -, 2 S.E.2d at 817.
60. Id. at _, 2 S.E.2d at 817.
61. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.00 (McKinney 1975) further defines "wiretapping" and
"mechanical overhearing of a conversation" as follows:
1. "Wiretapping" means the intentional overhearing or recording of a tele-
phonic or telegraphic communication by a person other than a sender or receiver
thereof, without the consent of either the sender or receiver, by means of any
instrument, device or equipment. . . . 2. "Mechanical overhearing of a conver-
sation" means the intentional overhearing or recording of a conversation or dis-
cussion, without the consent of at least one party thereto, by a person not pre-
sent thereat, by means of any instrument, device or equipment.
It should be noted that there is no mention in the statute of eavesdropping directly by ear,
without aid of any device.
62. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified, 487
F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973); Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920); 34 Hillside
Realty Corp. v. Norton, 198 Misc. 302, 305, 101 N.Y.S.2d 437, 440 (Bronx County Ct. 1950);
W. PROSSER, supra note 7, at § 36; RESTATEMENT § 286.
63. Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. at 227.
19821 265
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tect, would likely be successful.
A similar path might be followed by a plaintiff in a surveil-
lance dispute. It has been held in most jurisdictions that where the
surveillance, including shadowing, trailing, and filming, is done un-
obtrusively and in a reasonable manner, no cause of action lies for
invasion of privacy, since the exposure of fraudulent claims is of
substantial social and economic utility. 4 However, where the sur-
veillance is carried on in an unreasonable and obtrusive manner
with the intent of disturbing the sensibilities of an ordinary per-
son, such surveillance is held to be an actionable invasion of
privacy.
6 5
A typical example is another leading Georgia decision, Pinker-
ton National Detective Agency, Inc. v. Stevens,66 where the plain-
tiff alleged that defendant's agents followed her closely for months,
peered into her windows at night, called at her door in the guise of
salesmen, and daily parked a car across the street from her house,
all in such manner as to seriously upset her and excite the suspi-
cions of her neighbors. The court found that such acts were done
in a "vicious and malicious manner not reasonably limited and
designed to obtain information needed for the defense of plaintiff's
lawsuit against [defendant] but deliberately in a way calculated to
frighten and torment her,"6 " and the complaint was thus deemed
to state a cause of action. Although this implies that the intent of
the defendant to cause suffering of some sort to the plaintiff is a
critical element of the tort, the court noted later that "[w]hether
or not there is express malice, that is, a motive to harm the plain-
tiff by the activity engaged in, is immaterial, because the absence
of the motive will neither insulate the defendant if the tort is in
fact committed nor will its presence create a cause of action if none
otherwise exists." 68 Thus intent to harm appears not to be a criti-
cal element for recovery under this doctrine, an issue which is of
some significance in discussing recovery under New York common
law.6
9
A contrary holding appeared in McLain v. Boise Cascade
64. 62 AM. JuR. 2d Privacy § 41 (1972).
65. Id.
66. 108 Ga. App. 159, 132 S.E.2d 119 (1963).
67. Id. at , 132 S.E.2d at 123.
68. Id. at -, 132 S.E.2d at 124.
69. See infra text accompanying note 83.
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Corp., ° where surveillance and filming of plaintiff was done during
daylight hours and in such an unobtrusive manner that plaintiff
was not even aware of being observed. Defendant's hired investiga-
tors took motion pictures of plaintiff while standing at certain
points on the periphery of plaintiff's property. Finding that the
one instance of trespass plaintiff did observe did not alert him to
the surveillance, and that the activities filmed were open to public
view by neighbors or passers-by, the court concluded that the sur-
veillance was not unreasonable and denied recovery. The court did
state, however, that the right to recover damages for violation of
privacy was "well established in Oregon, 7 1 and cited the following
Restatement formulation as the "general rule" permitting such re-
covery: "One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise,
upon the solitude or seclusion of another, or his private affairs or
concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his pri-
vacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable
man. '7 2 Given the extreme conduct of the defendant in Pinkerton,
a plaintiff in New York seeking recovery against such a defendant
might again look to provisions of the Penal Law in basing a civil
suit. Section 240.25, prohibiting "harassment" as there defined, is
particularly appropriate, and again such plaintiff, as a member of
the protected class, and such conduct, as the type the statute pro-
hibits, meet the requirements for inferring a private cause of
action. 3
B. New York's "Emotional Distress" Doctrine
Another route to recovery, perhaps less circuitous and proba-
bly more effective, is under a line of New York tort cases which
grant recovery for emotional distress. The New York Court of Ap-
peals in Battalla v. State7 4 overruled its holding in Mitchell v.
Rochester Railway Co.7 5 and allowed recovery for "severe emo-
70. 271 Or. 549, 533 P.2d 343 (1975).
71. Id. at 554, 533 P.2d at 345.
72. RESTATEMENT § 652B.
73. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.25 (McKinney 1980). One difficulty the plaintiff might en-
counter, however, is in establishing the requisite intent on the part of the defendant to
"harass, annoy or alarm" the plaintiff.
74. 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).




tional and neurological disturbances with residual physical mani-
festations," without a showing of physical impact.76
Battalla concerned a claim that an employee of the state, in
placing the infant plaintiff in a chair lift, failed to properly secure
the safety belt, and as a result the child became frightened and
hysterical. In finding that the complaint for damages stated a
cause of action, the court, while acknowledging that plaintiff's inju-
ries might be somewhat speculative and difficult to prove, stated
that "[ifn the difficult cases, we must look to the quality and genu-
ineness of proof, and rely to an extent on the contemporary sophis-
tication of the medical profession and the ability of the court and
jury to weed out dishonest claims." '
The question left unanswered in that opinion, and still appar-
ently confused, is whether mental and emotional suffering are ac-
tionable without a showing of physical injury. New York courts'
pronouncements on the subject are somewhat vague. The court of
appeals in Johnson v. State of New York7 8 very cautiously ex-
tended the right to recovery for emotional injury without contem-
poraneous or consequential physical injury, in recognizing a cause
of action for the erroneous notification of plaintiff by defendant
hospital that plaintiff's mother had died. Plaintiff complained of
nightmares, irritability, inability to work, and general excessive
anxiety, as a result of defendant's negligence. In discussing its re-
luctance to allow recovery for emotional harm alone, the court
cited Prosser as follows:
The temporary emotion of fright, so far from serious that it does no physical
harm, is so evanescent a thing, so easily counterfeited, and usually so trivial,
that the courts have been quite unwilling to protect the plaintiff against mere
negligence, where the elements of extreme outrage and moral blame which
have had such weight in the case of the intentional tort are lacking.7
An apparently important distinction between "mere negli-
gence" and intentional conduct on the part of the defendant is
drawn by this language, but no further explanation of the differ-
ence, or indication of why this particular act was one rather than
the bther, is provided. Two years later in Howard v. Lecher,80 the
76. Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d at 239, 176 N.E.2d at 730, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
77. Id. at 242, 176 N.E.2d at 731-32, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
78. 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975).
79. Id. at 381, 334 N.E.2d at 594, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
80. 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977).
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same court cited Johnson as holding that recovery is allowable for
emotional harm caused by negligence if the harm is "genuine, sub-
stantial, and proximately caused by the defendant's conduct."81
Here the negligent/intentional distinction seems to be ignored, and
the dictum implies a further expansion of a plaintiff's right to re-
cover for psychic harm alone. Finally, a recent appellate division
opinion cited Battalla, Johnson, and Howard as standing for the
statement that "[i]t has become well-settled in New York that re-
covery may be had for emotional harm absent fear of potential
physical injury, to one subjected directly to the negligence of an-
other, so long as the psychic injury was genuine, substantial and
proximately caused by the defendant's conduct. 8s2 Thus the dic-
tum of the court of appeals has been interpreted, even in its own
opinions, to suggest that recovery may be granted for emotional
distress alone, without evidence of physical injury,83 and regardless
of whether the conduct causing the distress was deemed negligent
or intentional.
The decisions in this area frequently cite the Restatement for-
mulation regarding outrageous conduct: "One who by extreme and
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emo-
tional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional
distress .... 84
As the Comments to the Restatement make clear, the conduct
must be "intolerable in a civilized community, 8 5 and the'resulting
emotional distress must be extreme: not merely hurt feelings but
"so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure
it."Be Further, "[s]evere distress must be proved, but in many cases
81. Id. at 111, 366 N.E.2d at 67, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 365.
82. Aquilio v. Nelson, 78 A.D.2d 195, 198, 434 N.Y.S.2d 520, 522 (4th Dep't 1980). Re-
covery in this case was denied under the bystander rule, since the physical injury was suf-
fered by plaintiffs' child rather than plaintiffs.
83. One might also argue that drawing a clear distinction between mental and physical
harm is becoming more difficult. As suggested in Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental
Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237 (1971), medical science is
able, with increasing accuracy, to establish the existence and seriousness of emotional in-
jury, thus helping to move such injury away from the realm of speculation. Furthermore,
severe emotional distress is most commonly and plausibly manifested in some physical
symptoms, e.g., insomnia, hysteria, headache, ulcer, etc.
84. RESTATEMENT § 46. In New York, see Fischer v. Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d 553, 373
N.E.2d 1215, 402 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1978).
85. RESTATEMENT § 46, at comment d.
86. Id. at comment j.
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the extreme and outrageous nature of the defendant's conduct is in
itself important evidence that the distress has existed."87 Finally,
the Restatement rule as to intent is said to apply where the defen-
dant desires to inflict severe emotional distress, or knows such dis-
tress is certain, or acts recklessly, in deliberate disregard of a high
degree of probability that such distress will result.88 Therefore an
actual intent to inflict emotional distress need not be shown; mere
recklessness and the likelihood of such distress resulting are
sufficient.
In light of the readiness of New York courts to recognize
claims of emotional injury, it is entirely plausible that claims of
unreasonable intrusion would be similarly recognized if ap-
proached in that manner. The conduct of the agents in Pinkerton
could reasonably be termed outrageous and intolerable; such con-
duct could be considered as likely to result in severe emotional dis-
tress, thus meeting the "intent" requirement; and the plaintiff's
understandable reaction could certainly be considered severe emo-
tional distress. An identical analysis is possible in the eavesdrop-
ping disputes and other instances of intrusive invasion of privacy.
Indeed, since the gravamen of any invasion of privacy action is the
mental and emotional disturbance which results, this doctrine
seems most appropriate.
One commentator has disparaged this approach,8 for two
principal reasons: First, it is asserted, the emotional distress theory
does not apply where the defendant stealthily intrudes, and
neither intends to cause mental distress nor recklessly disregards
the likelihood. Second, it is more difficult for a plaintiff to prove
severe emotional distress than invasion of privacy, since under the
latter theory one need show only that the intrusion was unreasona-
ble and would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
As to the first criticism, where a defendant intrudes stealthily,
with no intent to cause mental distress, he or she is still subject to
liability for any severe emotional distress caused. The requisite
"intent" is found to exist in the pursuit of an act from which the
defendant knows such distress is substantially certain to result. 0
Thus, a defendant's care to act surreptitiously does not preclude
87. Id.
88. Id. at comment i.
89. Greenawalt, supra note 11, at 175.
90. RESTATEMENT § 46, comment i.
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liability for resulting emotional distress.
In response to the second criticism, it should be noted that the
decisions in jurisdictions which do recognize the tort of invasion of
privacy indicate that in proving that tort, the same process is re-
quired as in proving the New York tort of emotional distress. That
is, the intent and conduct of the defendant and the reaction of the
plaintiff must be evaluated against a reasonableness standard;
whether an "unreasonable" and "highly offensive" intrusion is
more egregious than "outrageous and extreme" conduct may well
be more a matter of semantics than of legal fact-finding. Further,
although severe emotional distress need not be proven per se
under the right to privacy formulation, it is difficult to imagine
proving an intrusion highly offensive without some substantial
showing that it caused emotional distress.
In conclusion, there appears at present to be substantial judi-
cial support in New York for a recognition of the right of individu-
als to be free from intrusive invasions of privacy. Furthermore, the
existing tort system, with no real gaps, can provide adequately for
the relief of plaintiffs suffering such an intrusion.
JANE E. MARKLE
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